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1. BACKGROUND 
In recent research literature differing accounts of the European public 
sphere (EPS) have been offered. We can find at least four ways to under-
stand the concept: 
 The EPS understood as an agora, as a space of critical debate and 
opinion formation which is open to all European citizens and has 
established structures and procedures; 
 The EPS understood as a special way of organizing relations be-
tween an individual and society, historically shaped and matured 
in Europe; 
 The EPS understood as distinct from national public spheres, con-
sisting of all public debates and discussions which concern Europe 
and European issues; 
 The EPS understood empirically, consisting of all public represen-
tations that the European media produce.  
Most research seems to have centered on the first approach, although 
from different standpoints. Where the followers of deliberative democ-
racy have adopted the European public sphere as a positive regulative 
idea (see e.g. Habermas, 2006), the advocates of radical democracy criti-
cize its forced homogeneity and propose instead a pluralized concept of 
the public sphere (see e.g. Mouffe, 2000).  
The second approach, which is perhaps best articulated by Charles 
Taylor, has been less discussed (Taylor, 1992, 2004). Although having a 
strong affinity to the ideals of deliberative democracy, it takes the debate 
to a more general level. According to Taylor his approach is based on a 
‘cultural’ theory of modernity, in contrast to an ‘a-cultural’ one referring 
to an empiricist-positivist approach (Taylor, 1992).  
The third and fourth approaches are less theoretically developed. The 
definition of the EPS as distinct from national public spheres appears in 
THE RESEARCHING AND TEACHING COMMUNICATION SERIES 106
the documents of the EU (see e.g. Wallström, 2005); the EPS as an empiri-
cal totality of European media contents is sometimes used in a cultural-
critical sense to contrast the dominance of commercial interests in the 
mainstream media to the participatory-democratic potential of the 
counter public spheres of activist networks.  
For the purposes of this chapter I will concentrate here only on the 
second or ‘cultural’ approach. Although I will adopt some of Charles 
Taylor’s conceptual and theoretical tools, I will apply them freely in 
building up my own theoretical framework. 
2. NORMATIVE-PRESCRIPTIVE VS. CULTURAL-DIAGNOSTIC 
APPROACH 
First I need to clarify the distinction between the first and second 
approach a bit further. As I mentioned above, the first approach presents 
the EPS as a regulative idea: It is an ideal which may never be fully real-
ized but which can act as a normative framework for critical evaluation. 
The EPS as an ideal would require an institutional framework for the 
creation of European public opinion and will formation, inclusive to all 
European citizens. The EPS would thus give necessary legitimization for 
European decision-making and governance, which are now in great 
difficulties. I call this approach normative-prescriptive.  
From this point of view, the main obstacle for the EPS is the historical 
anchoring of the public sphere to the narrow and limited frames of Euro-
pean nation states. This is not only a practical problem, concerning the 
actual functioning of public institutions, but also a theoretical and 
conceptual problem which concerns critical research (see e.g. Fraser, 
2000). The task of critical scholarly debate is to bring about the concep-
tual and theoretical means to realize the potential and establish a 
transnational European public sphere.  
From this point of view, the question is: How best to create the condi-
tions and institutional framework for as extensive and inclusive forma-
tion of European public opinion as realistically possible? To what extent 
do elements of this already exist, and what is the role of the media? What 
should or what could be the role of the EU in this? Etc. 
Many scholars have aptly criticized the ideal of a (European) Public 
Sphere for its allegedly naïve understanding of power relations (see e.g. 
Mouffe, 2000; Gould, 1998). In the context of this chapter, I will not go 
into this discussion. 
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The difference between the first and second approach is not so much 
in their normative outlooks but in their analytical emphasizes: If I called 
the former approach normative-prescriptive, the latter can perhaps be 
characterized as cultural-diagnostic. (Another and perhaps more apt 
would be historical-sociological.) The main difference between them can 
be put in the following way: In order to make prescriptive judgments we 
need a better understanding of the historical and sociological 
(pre)conditions of the phenomenon that we call the (European) public 
sphere.  
Thus, we need to ask such questions as: What is our shared under-
standing of Europe and Europeaness, and from where have we adopted 
it; how do we speak of Europe and of being Europeans in contrast to 
other countries and communities; what kind of status do our conceptions 
of Europe have in our everyday life; how are the public discourses on 
Europe and Europeaness produced; etc. A key question naturally is: 
Who are ‘we’ from whose point of view the above questions are articu-
lated; whom do we include in the ‘we’, whom we exclude.  
3. ON HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
My starting point here is that our conceptions of Europe and Euro-
peaness form an indistinguishable part of our background knowledge of 
the world (see Taylor, 2004). We think Europe as ‘our’ continent, Euro-
peaness as ‘our’ culture in distinction to America, Asia, Africa, which all 
are ‘different’, each in their own ways. We have adopted our European 
identity through many institutionalized practices which support each 
other: childhood socialization, school education, the media and other 
forms of our symbolic environment.  
As historians have emphasized, Europe as an idea, as ‘our’ Europe, is 
not a modern invention. It begun to take shape early in Ancient Greece, 
when the division between Europe and its ‘others’, Asia and Africa, was 
first articulated (see e.g. Pagden, 2002; Rietsbergen, 2006). This basic 
distinction was strengthened and institutionalized especially by the 
Catholic Church, and has been interwoven in many ways into the Euro-
pean mythologies.  
The public sphere, on the other hand, is clearly a modern phenome-
non – although its historical roots have often been placed in Ancient 
Greece too. The public sphere as a distinct mode of social relationships, 
as it is for instance conceptualized in the works of Jürgen Habermas 
(1989) and John Dewey (1994), seems to be a phenomenon which is 
uniquely part of modern European cultural and political history (also in 
THE RESEARCHING AND TEACHING COMMUNICATION SERIES 108
its North-American varieties). It is seen as one of the cornerstones of 
individual moral autonomy, characteristic to the Western modernity (see 
Taylor, 2004).  
In Habermas’ presentation, the concept of an autonomous individual 
subject is developed in the battles of the emerging urban middle classes 
(or bourgeoisie) on the one hand, against the autocratic King and his/her 
court, and on the other, against the religious conservatism of the church. 
In these battles the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit, openness, publicity) was 
effectively used both as a means and as a motto, and its idea became 
indistinguishably embedded in the self-identity of the emerging bour-
geois middle classes. 
Since then, both as a means of democratic governance and as a 
regulative idea, the concept of the public sphere was adopted as part of 
the self-understanding of modern liberal democracy. How it has been 
institutionalized in the European level can be observed e.g. in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950).  
An interesting perspective on the historical constitution of the public 
sphere is offered by Juha Partanen’s division between the four borders 
surrounding what is understood as the public sphere (1985). In his 
account, on the first side are the things which are considered private and 
intimate; on the second side are the things which belong to secrecy; on 
the third side are the taboos, the things of which it is forbidden to make 
public representations; and on the fourth side are the things which are 
still unknown and as such non-representable and non-conceptualizable. 
The borders between the public sphere and the four areas are in a 
constant flux. Historically, the division between public and private has 
changed greatly, as has the divide between public and secret. Old taboos 
have become public and new taboos are established, new unknown areas 
are delineated, etc. Although the borders are flexible, they can yield to 
both ways, which means that there is no automatic historical expansion 
of the public sphere. We have seen lately that in the name of the War on 
Terror the public sphere has been challenged from all four borders e.g. 
(see e.g. BBC, 31.7.2006). The question becomes then: Who controls the 
borders, and why and how are they controlled.  
4. EUROPE AS A PUBLIC SPHERE OF NETWORKS 
I have claimed above that there is a certain historical background knowl-
edge which, at least in a loose cultural sense, unites all educated Euro-
peans despite their language and nationality. It is embedded first of all in 
the institutions of socialization, education and the daily media. The ques-
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tion is, however, that as these institutions are mostly firmly national in 
character, bound by the customs and laws of nation states: How are they 
supposed to promote a common understanding on Europe and Euro-
peanness?  
We can seek for an answer in the fact that Europe actually consists – 
and has always consisted – of numerous transnational networks of coop-
eration (on global networks, see McNeill & McNeill, 2003). Many of them 
have developed over several centuries and are anchored firmly as part of 
European and global relations. One of the oldest and most powerful net-
works is the Catholic Church. Other traditional networks are also those 
functioning in the area of art and humanities. Lately the economic and 
commercial networks – with their ever-expanding arms of financial 
institutions – have gained a more and more dominating role in defining 
Europe and Europeanness both in our continent and globally too.  
These networks have evolved simultaneously with the gradual emer-
gence of the nation states, having been reined sometimes more strictly 
and sometimes more loosely by the governments. Mostly, however, the 
networks have developed autonomously, being able to establish their 
own inner cohesion with the functional logics and criteria of efficiency of 
their own. Each network has also been able – at least to certain degree – 
to define its own criteria concerning the borders between what is public 
and what is private, secret, taboo or unknown. 
In the general course of the process of differentiation, which is 
characteristic for Western modernity (see Luhmann, 1982; Habermas, 
1987), these networks have specialized and created their own normative 
systems, i.e. criteria of judging what is good and bad, right and wrong, 
etc. Sometimes these normative systems of different networks are close 
to each other or mutually supportive, as e.g. in the case of many religious 
movements (see the Ecumenical Movement, WCC, 2006) and the 
supporters of the social welfare state; sometimes they are exclusive, as is 
the case between the networks in arts and humanities compared to those 
in the stock market. In the latter case, an attempt to measure the validity 
and efficiency of the networks in arts and culture using the criteria 
applied in the stock market would be a violation of the autonomy of the 
networks in arts and culture. 
It is obvious that in their own public spheres these networks also 
produce and introduce issues for other public spheres, including such 
public spheres which are addressed not only to the members of certain 
network but to publics at large. An example is the environmental move-
ment who has its ‘own’ public sphere supported by journals and maga-
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zines, websites and e-mail lists. At the same time it takes part in the 
debate in wider public spheres, both national and transnational.  
The problem is that there are issues where the mere public debate is 
not enough but coordinated action is needed, as with the issues concern-
ing environment, security, employment etc. In many cases transnational 
coordination of action can take place through voluntary agreements, as 
happens with many civil society associations (e.g. environmental 
organizations, trade unions etc.). However, when more formally binding 
mediation is required (energy, security etc.), the mediation shifts to the 
level of inter-governmental cooperation, with all its positive and nega-
tive aspect, as the experiences of the EU has shows us. 
The fact that economic and commercial networks have gained a more 
and more dominating role in defining Europe and Europeanness has 
brought about an increasing tension between the autonomy of the net-
works and the urge to curve this autonomy in the name of better eco-
nomic efficiency and productivity. The argument is that from the point 
of view of Europe’s global competitiveness, all areas of public activities – 
including civil society networks – should be brought to support the unity 
of the EU and its adopted goals. This can be paraphrased as the need to 
make the Union ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion’ (European Council, Lisbon, March 2000; see 
Euractiv, 2006; EPHA, 2006). From the point of view of the civil society 
networks, this would result in ‘streamlining’ the functional logics of 
different networks and their normative bases on the basis of economic 
efficiency. An illuminating example of this is the way how the goals of 
the EU’s 7th Framework Program for Research have been set (see Cordis, 
2006).  
Against this development several scholars have emphasized the 
capacity of the networks for self-defense, presented in the form of new 
social movements and civil society networks. Often-cited examples 
include the recent anti-globalization movement, environmental cam-
paigns, etc. Using the potential of new information and communication 
technologies (Internet, mobile technology etc.), they have established 
transnational counter public spheres opposing the hegemony of the elite 
controlled public spheres. However, as these movements and networks 
are so diverse and constantly changing, it is not yet clear what their 
analytical status should be from the point of view of resisting the 
‘streamlining’ tendency described above. (See Bennett, 2003; Dahlgren, 
2004). 
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5. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TWO LEVELS OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE 
I have discussed above the general conditions of the emergence of the 
modern European public sphere. In the classic accounts of the devel-
opment of the public sphere, it is usually linked with the birth of the 
press and other forms of mass communication. How should we 
accommodate the media with the diagnostic approach outlined above? 
In order to get a better analytical grip on the role of the media I propose 
a distinction between two levels of the public sphere: 
 firstly, there is the realm of the social imaginary or shared back-
ground understanding, assumedly common to all European edu-
cated citizens, 
 secondly, there is the public sphere proper, which is actual, media-
related or media-constructed and works on a daily basis. 
The public sphere proper actualizes when some issue or event becomes 
significant for us, when it captures our attention for a reason or another. 
In order to be meaningful and understood, the issue or event calls for 
interpretative elements from our shared conceptual reservoir. This can 
be illuminated by a piece of news of the situation in the Middle East. If 
we are missing the necessary background understanding of why and 
how the situation has come about, news about the Middle East does not 
make sense to us.  
I have mentioned above the processes of differentiation between 
different areas of social life, characteristic to Western modernity. The 
resulting increasing autonomy of networks is reflected in many ways in 
the public sphere, too. One manifestation is the different evaluation crite-
ria applied to different areas of social life and to the networks operating 
on these areas.  
An empirical case of this differentiation is the historical process of the 
compartmentalization of content in the newspaper press (see e.g. Pietilä, 
1980; Tommila & Salokangas, 1998). In the early history of newspapers 
there was no clear distinction between news, reports, columns, and other 
forms of content. Only gradually did the process of the division of news 
and other content into different sections of the newspaper take place: We 
got domestic news, foreign news, news on politics, economic news, 
sports, human interest and other sections. Another form of differentia-
tion is the division between different modalities in content: We as read-
ers can easily make a distinction between news reports, editorial opin-
ions and commercials.  
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There is a close connection between the modern media and our 
understanding of citizenship. To a large extent our conception of citizen-
ship has been informed by the media and their given understanding of 
the ‘proper’ and ‘natural’ relations between different areas of life. This 
also includes an implicitly adopted background understanding of the 
criteria of rightness and truthfulness, characteristic to each of the differ-
ent areas and the respective networks. 
Problems arise, when these borders are confused and traditionally 
applied criteria do not appear valid any more. One example is the 
claimed entertainmentalization of political journalism, allegedly a central 
feature of the tabloidization process of the media. Another example is 
the recent phenomenon of reality TV, which has bemused the audiences 
and confused traditional notions of the borders between fact and fiction. 
These tendencies have raised quite a lot public concern, based on the 
claim that a big part of the public does not have necessary competence to 
interpret the new hybrid program forms in a way that makes sense or in 
a way that the producers have expected. 
6. FULL CITIZENSHIP? 
The concept of citizenship includes the competencies an individual 
member of society needs in order to be able to rationally function in his 
or her interests. Full citizenship refers to the citizen as an autonomous 
subject who has the capacity to make necessary distinctions between 
different areas of social life and their respective functional logics, and 
apply them in a meaningful way. (See Painter, 2003; Lister, 2006)  
The problem is that the concept of citizenship assumes a more or less 
homogeneous form of background knowledge of all the members of 
society. In real world this is obviously not the case: There are big differ-
ences between different social groups within any national society, not to 
speak of the whole of Europe. (Young, 1990; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) 
As mentioned above, when speaking of ‘we’ we usually refer to the 
experiences and ways of thinking of the members of educated urban 
middle classes, from which also the members of national and European 
elites are recruited. These elites have a central role in how Europe and 
Europeanness are defined in the public sphere.  
There is a considerable amount of literature on citizenship and on the 
competencies an individual needs in order to be able to claim and exer-
cise her or his rights as a citizen (see e.g. Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; 
Feldblum, 1997; Painter, 2003). For the purposes of this chapter, I men-
tion here only two factors which restrict (and facilitate as well) these 
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competencies: education on one hand and language and culture on the 
other. The better educated the citizens are, the more homogeneous is 
their social imaginary and with it their background knowledge.  
The significance of language and culture is partly, but only partly 
directly linked to education. Members of linguistic and cultural minori-
ties do not spontaneously have access to the same social imaginary and 
background knowledge as the majority communities do, and vice versa. 
Non-spoken values, norms, myths – often beyond public articulation – 
hinder the experience of full citizenship of the members of minority 
communities. As a large part of our background knowledge is ‘silent’ – 
i.e. non-spoken and non-cognitive – it cannot be formally taught and 
cognitively transmitted. Thus it is also excluded from the formal curric-
ula of educational institutions. This means also that many issues in the 
public sphere proper are fully understood only by those members of 
audience who are advised in their interpretation through the common 
background knowledge.  
7. DIFFERENTIATION AND CULTURAL INTERPRETERS 
I have described above the processes of differentiation between the areas 
of social action and the problems which concern the establishment of 
functional coordination between them. As different areas of social action 
are based on different functional logics, their coordination requires 
specialized expertise and interpretation.  
In democracy all social activities must be justifiable on the grounds of 
a common background understanding and shared value basis. This is 
why democracy needs interpreters who can reasonably explain the 
specialized needs of different areas of action in critical public debate, and 
can also produce respective orientative proposals of mutually coordi-
nated action to the society at large.  
We can see this interpretative orientation at work e.g. in the news-
papers’ editorials, covering a number of areas of specialized knowledge 
and presenting suggestions for coordinated action or policy proposals. 
My example here is based on a sample of editorials in Helsingin Sanomat, 
the leading metropolitan paper in Finland, which in four days time cov-
ered a variety of issues such as the state of Russian oil industry, 
Finland’s state budget, Japanese nationalism, EU’s contribution to 
Congo’s elections, the dot.com boom in the stock market, and nursing 
ethics at Finnish hospitals (HS editorials from 28 to 31 July 2006). 
In respect of the two levels of the public sphere as sketched above, 
democracy requires two types of interpreters: Those who specialize in 
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the matters on the level of background knowledge, and whom we can 
initially call ‘ideologues’, and those who specialize mainly in the matters 
on the public sphere proper and whom we can call ‘mediators’ (cf. 
Bauman, 1987).  
The task of the ideologues is to upgrade and renew our background 
knowledge so that our basic values, norms and beliefs are brought in 
accordance with our new experiences of the world and that the back-
ground knowledge makes us able to make sense of the world. Main 
institutional forums for the ideologues are education, science and 
research, arts and culture.  
The task of the mediators – journalists, teachers, cultural critics, public 
intellectuals– is to offer answers to daily issues and phenomena, and 
interpret them with the help of the expert services of the ideologues, i.e. 
to refresh the daily functional competence of citizens. From the point of 
view of the European public sphere, this means that actual issues and 
daily events must be interpreted through the conceptual tools of the local 
and nationally shared background knowledge. Again, if the members of 
the public do not share – at least minimally – a common conceptual 
reservoir, only a part of the public is able to make sense of the public 
sphere.  
From the point of view of the European public sphere, we can see 
several problems arising. One is linked with the work of ideologues. 
They can work only with the material that can be critically contested and 
from which justifiable arguments can be derived, and the conclusions 
should be acceptable by the criteria shared by the community.  
Thinking of the recent developments in different European countries, 
including the results of the referenda on European Constitution in 
France and the Netherlands in summer of 2005, the questions concerning 
Europe and the future of the EU seem to be still too controversial and 
contested among the different elite groups that all attempts for simple 
answers are doomed to fail. No firm conclusions can be drawn which 
could be justified through a consensus, or at least by a widely shared 
majority opinion within the community ideologues. The concepts of 
Europe and Europeanness are still in flux, even so much that there is not 
enough shared background understanding to make common definitions 
possible.  
This makes the work of the mediators problematic: It is difficult and 
often even impossible to make sense of the issues and phenomena con-
cerning Europe and Europeanness as long as the common conceptual 
reservoir is lacking. 
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Another problem concerns the varied competences for citizenship of 
members of different social communities. Especially problematic is the 
situation of many immigrant communities. It seems that in many Euro-
pean countries the authorities are planning special models of ‘reduced 
citizenship’ for the non-European immigrant communities. The aim is 
not to promote full citizenship but instead, a more restricted one which 
would bring about the competence of a legal subject (or confirm an 
earlier imposed one) but would not give the rights of a full cultural, 
social and political subject. (See e.g. the debate in OpenDemocracy, 
2006.)  
8. CONCLUSIONS 
What follows from the cultural-diagnostic approach that I have outlined 
above? Briefly put: our conceptions of Europe and Europeanness are 
always products of a certain situation-bound public discourse. Although 
our conceptions are anchored in our historically grounded background 
knowledge on the meaning of Europe and Europeanness, their defini-
tions are not clearly marked. Dominant definitions are ever-temporary 
compromises between competing elites, both national and transnational. 
Through their battles and compromises also the borders of the European 
public sphere are delineated again and again – i.e. what is possible to say 
in public and what is not, which issues and which approaches are fa-
vored and which are not, etc. 
The dominant definitions must however always be anchored to the 
commonly shared background knowledge, to the intersubjectively 
shared social imaginary, recognized by at least the majority of people. If 
not, the elite discourse of Europe and Europeanness does not make sense, 
does not appeal to the popular social imaginary, and does not find a 
connection with the lived experience of the European people. 
It seems obvious that the latest attempts to establish a European 
public sphere have suffered from this type of elite bias. The dominant 
discourse of Europe, managed by the economic elites, includes the 
notion of Europe primarily as an economic entity which all Europeans 
should support and promote, which does not appeal widely to the popu-
lar background knowledge outside the elites, as shown in many recent 
opinion polls (see e.g. Eurobarometer 251, 2006; 255:2006). The result is 
that the mediators in the public sphere proper are not able to lean on the 
ideologues’ expert services, as the needed commonly shared background 
knowledge has not yet been formed.  
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If I try now to answer the question of the title of this chapter, my 
answer would be: There is a commonly shared background under-
standing of the relationship between an individual and society that we 
can call European and Europeanness. When I say ‘commonly shared’, I 
mean that this background understanding and the social imaginary 
arising from it, are shared by the educated urban middle classes, and 
that it includes more or less uniform sensibility of European history, 
European arts and culture, European humanism, European modernity. 
In this sense it also forms a kind of a ‘proto public sphere’, a proto-EPS.  
This background understanding does not, however, include firm and 
solid definitions of what Europe and Europeanness mean in each 
instance and each situation. It is more like a reservoir of possible defini-
tions and significations which actualize in different ways in different 
circumstances in the European public spheres proper.  
Following from this, there is not a European public sphere in the 
sense that we could imagine the formation of a European public opinion 
or a European common will formation. There are no institutional struc-
tures nor are there democratic procedures to fulfill these functions. 
Instead, there are a variety of different European and transnational net-
works, exercising their own public spheres and bringing forward ele-
ments for European public discourses which realize in different forms 
and in different forums. 
There is still one question left: Is a European public sphere proper 
needed, in the sense of European public opinion and will formation. This 
question belongs, however, to the area of the normative-prescriptive 
debate, and engaging with that debate has not been the purpose of this 
chapter. 
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